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Surveillance on the Internet: A Comparison of the United States and European
Approaches to Protection of Privacy on the Internet in the Face of Increased Government
Monitoring in an Effort to Combat Domestic Terrorism
I. Hypothetical
Concerned with the ever present threat of terrorism and the growing influence of ISIS, the
Federal Government has begun to monitor domestic accessing of websites containing ISIS based
content. The Government’s surveillance program begins by compiling a list of “target websites”
based on the site’s ISIS related content. The Government tracks who accesses these websites by
identifying each IP address of every person that visits a “target site.” The Government will then
create a database compiling all of the IP addresses of the individuals who access these sites. The
Government will then run searches within the database to identify individuals who have been
frequently visiting these “target sites.” If an IP address is identified as frequently visiting the
“target sites,” they will be deemed a “high volume” user. Once an IP address is deemed “high
volume,” the Government will then target that individual for further monitoring. This further
surveillance will involve the Government obtaining the personal information for the user of each
“high volume” IP address, as well as continually monitoring all of the IP addresses that individual
accesses. The Government will conduct this surveillance without warrants.
A suit is brought by an individual who was identified as a high volume user and became
aware that all of his internet browsing was being monitored. This individual is claiming that the
government violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights by obtaining his IP address through the
“target website” monitoring and subsequently monitoring his “outgoing” IP addresses.
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An IP address is a number that marks a “location” on the internet. Every website on the
internet has only one IP address. So, for example, even a website as expansive as Google has one
unique IP address that every person visiting that website connects to. Additionally, each individual
who accesses the internet has a unique IP address that is assigned to them.
II. The Right to Privacy in the United States
a. Brief History of the Development of the Right to Privacy through the Fourth
Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.”1
The United States Constitution, unlike many foreign country’s constitutions, does not
contain an explicit “right to privacy.” While not explicitly included, the Supreme Court has found
there to be a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.2 The Fourth Amendment protects
individual’s “privacy” by not allowing for their private property be to be unreasonably searched
or seized without a warrant.
Fourth Amendment privacy protection has evolved over time to allow for protection from
different kinds of government invasions. In its early stages, privacy protection was limited to
stopping the Government from physically encroaching on an individual’s property.3 However,
1

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3
See Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
2
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with the advent of new technologies, the Court has recognized that there can be an invasion of
privacy through Government conduct that does not involve physical intrusion.4 The move away
from requiring physical intrusion for there to be a Fourth Amendment violation recognized that
communication itself was private and should be protected.5 While Katz was a case dealing with
communication through the phone, Fourth Amendment protection has continued to evolve to
protect new technologies by applying the reasoning laid out in Katz.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches of private property by the
Government, unless the Government has obtained a warrant to do so. Therefore, in order to prove
a Fourth Amendment violation, an individual would first need to show that there was a “search”
by the Government. If they can show that there was a search and the Government did not have a
warrant for that search, the burden would shift to the Government to show that their search was
valid despite not having a warrant.
In our hypothetical, an individual argues that the Government conducted a Fourth
Amendment “search” when they obtained his IP address. Therefore, our analysis begins with
consideration of whether government conduct of this nature is considered a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment.
In order to show that there was a Fourth Amendment search, it first must be shown that the
Government accessed something that was protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under modern
Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine, there are two ways by which a defendant can achieve this:
(1) showing that the government encroached on something he had a “reasonable expectation of

4

See Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
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Id.
3

privacy” or (2) that the government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information.”6
Since there was no physical occupation here, in order to prove that there was a search
Defendant would need to meet the requirements of Katz.7 In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice
Harlan laid out a two-part test for analyzing whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.8 This test contains a subjective and objective prong, first requiring that the individual
subjectively believed that he had a right to privacy and second that that expectation of privacy was
one that society accepts as reasonable.9
Analysis of whether there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy test” will frequently
involve employing the third-party doctrine as stated in Smith v. Maryland.10 Under the third-party
doctrine, information loses its Fourth Amendment protection once it is voluntarily shared with a
third-party.11

However, recognizing the potential for a complete erosion of Fourth Amendment

protection as a result of the third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court in Smith limited their holding
based on whether the information was “content of communication.”12 Even if disclosed to a thirdparty, any information that is deemed to be “contents of communication” will retain its Fourth

6

See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, see also United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
In Jones, the Court applied the physical intrusion test to GPS tracking of an individual’s car by
the Government. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 953. While the GPS signals were sent electronically, the
police physically placed the GPS device on his car, making it a physical intrusion on his private
property. Ibid. The Jones Court discussed the future application of the two tests, stating that
when the surveillance only involves the transmission of electronic signals, then the Katz test still
applies. Ibid.
8
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
9
Ibid.
10
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
11
Id. at 743-44.
12
U.S. v. DiTomasso, No. 14-cr-160 (SAS), 2014 WL 5462467 at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28,
2014)(citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 741).
7
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Amendment protection.13 On the other hand, if the information is deemed to be “the ancillary
information that the act of communication incidentally discloses,” then the information loses its
Fourth Amendment protection once it is disclosed to a third-party.14 Today, the distinction
between “content” and “non-content” is also frequently described as the difference between “data”
and “metadata.”15
Since its holding was announced, Smith has served as the starting point for evaluation as
to whether information is “content” and thus still protected despite third-party disclosure. Courts
have attempted to analogize modern technologies and surveillance methods with the factual
situation in Smith to reach this decision.16
In Smith, the government, without a warrant, caused the telephone company to install a
“pen register” at its offices to record the numbers dialed on the home phone of the defendant.17
The government used the phone numbers dialed by the defendant to confirm their suspicion that
he was the one making phone calls associated with a crime.18 This dialing information was used
to obtain a warrant to search Defendant’s home, who was later convicted.19 The Court in Smith
rejected the defendant’s argument that there was a Fourth Amendment violation, based on the
conclusion that the installation of the pen register did not constitute a “search.”20 In reaching this
holding, the Court concluded that the phone numbers dialed were not “contents” of the phone call

13

Ibid.
Ibid.
15
DiTamasso 2014 WL 5462467 at *3.
16
See e.g., U.S. v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th Cir. 2007); American Civil Liberties Union
v. Clapper, 959 F.Supp.2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
17
Smith 442 U.S. at 737.
18
Ibid.
19
Id. at 737-38.
20
Id. at 745-46.
14
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that was made, so there was no protection due to the disclosure of the dialed numbers to the phone
company.21
The holding in Smith says that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for “noncontent” that is disclosed to a third-party.22 The rationale behind this holding is that the objective
prong of the Katz test is not met because it is no longer reasonable to expect that the information
will remain private because you cannot control what that third-party will do with the information.23
The importance of the determination of whether something is “contents” under the thirdparty doctrine cannot be overstated. Once something is “not protected” by the Fourth Amendment,
it can be freely obtained by the Government without a warrant. If the information is not protected,
then there is no “search” in obtaining it and the burden will not shift to the Government to have to
argue that a warrant was not necessary.
b. Development of the Right to Privacy with Respect to Modern Technology
1. Standard that Has Been Applied
With respect to modern technology, as long as there is no physical intrusion by the
Government, courts continue to apply the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to
determine whether the information obtained by the Government is protected by the Fourth
Amendment.24 Additionally, Smith has been applied to almost every surveillance case involving

21

Ibid.
Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509.
23
Ibid.
24
See e.g., U.S. v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573-74 (3rd Cir. 2010), Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509.
22
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information from internet or cell phone use, as all such communication is relayed through a thirdparty, whether it be an internet service provider (“ISP”) or cell service provider.25
2. The Internet and the “Content” vs. “Non-Content” Distinction
In our hypothetical, the Government compiled the IP addresses of every person who visited
a “target site.” Since the internet use was conveyed through an ISP, the third-party doctrine of
Smith would have to be considered. This leaves the question or whether an IP address is “content”
under Smith. Courts that have addressed this issue have concluded an IP address is not content.
As discussed above, IP addresses can be used to identify both the individual who is using
the internet as well as the websites which that user visits. Courts have discussed IP addresses in
both contexts. In Christie, the court monitored a particular website to see what IP addresses were
“incoming,” ultimately using the IP address to find out personal information on the individual who
accessed the monitored site.26 In Forrester, on the other hand, the court was looking at “outgoing”
IP addresses and thus monitoring the websites the individual was visiting.27

In both cases, the

same conclusion was ultimately reached: individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy
for their IP addresses, and therefore they are not protected under the Fourth Amendment.28
In U.S. v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of a government
surveillance program that, among other things, obtained the IP addresses of websites the defendant
visited.29 The government had applied for and received court permission to install a “mirror port”

25

See e.g., Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509-511, Clapper, 959 F.Supp.2d 724, 749-52.
Christie, 624 F.3d at 573-74.
27
Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
28
Christie 624 F.3d at 574; Forrester 512 F.3d at 510.
29
Forrester 512 F.3d at 509.
26
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at the ISP connection facility.30 The “mirror port” recorded the internet activity of the defendant
and allowed the government to learn the “to and from” of his email communications, the IP
addresses of the websites he visited, and the total volume of information sent to or from his
account.31
The court ultimately rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the surveillance
because they concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment “search.”32 The court applied the
third-party doctrine and determined that the “mirror port” was not “content” as it was analogous
to the pen register in Smith.33 The court reached this conclusion by determining that an IP address
is voluntarily conveyed to the ISP and that an IP address does not contain any more information
about the contents of communication than phone numbers dialed.34 While the court recognized
that the nature of the communication could potentially be deduced based on the website name,
they concluded that this does not distinguish the case from Smith because that could also be done
with phone numbers dialed.35
In Christie, the Third Circuit determined that there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment when the government recorded defendant’s IP address and subsequently used the IP
address to get the defendant’s personal information.36 Here, the defendant was convicted of crimes
related to his involvement in the distribution of a child pornography through a website. 37 The
government began monitoring the website and obtained the IP addresses of those who accessed

30

Id. at 505.
Ibid.
32
Id. at 509.
33
Id. at 510.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Christie 624 F.3d at 574.
37
Id. at 562.
31
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it.38 Once the IP addresses were identified, the government brought the IP address information to
the ISP to obtain the personal details of the individual who the IP address was assigned to.39 The
defendant in this case was one of the individuals who was identified through this process.40 The
court applied the third-party doctrine and concluded that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his IP address, and therefore the government’s conduct did not constitute
a “search.”41
The distinction between “content” and “non-content” information has also applied to
similar situations involving statutory, as opposed to Fourth Amendment, violations. Despite
applying different law, courts have reached the same general conclusion, IP addresses are not
“content” of internet communication.
In addressing such a statutory claim, The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts analyzed what constituted “content” with respect to obtaining IP addresses of
websites recorded through a pen register.42 The requirements for obtaining a “pen register” were
laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).43 Included in these requirements is that the pen register cannot
record the “contents of communication.”44 The court also applied 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), which
defines “contents” to “include[] any information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of
that communication.45

38

Id. at 563.
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Id. at 573-74.
42
In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing use of A Pen Register and Trap,
396 F.Supp.2d 45, 48 (D.Mass.2005).
43
Id. at 47.
44
Ibid.
45
Id. at 48.
39
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Under the pen register sought by the government, the ISP would be required to provide
them with the incoming and outgoing IP addresses of the particular account which is subject to the
pen register.46 The court held that the IP address of websites visited, on its own, did not contain
“contents of communication.”47
However, the court went on to identify closely related information that would could be
obtained through the pen register that would cross the line into being “content.”48 Specifically,
the court discussed a potential issue if the user entered search terms, and those search terms
appeared in a URL recorded by the pen register.4950 In applying the statutory definition of
“content” to this type of URL, the court stated that “the ‘substance’ and ‘meaning’ of the
communication is that user is conducting a search for information on a particular topic.”51 In so
holding, the court drew a distinction between search terms and a website name, concluding that
while an IP address is not protected, search terms crossed the line into being “contents” and thus
are protected by the Fourth Amendment.52
The approach of In re Application has been discussed in the Fourth Amendment context in
Forrester.53 There, the court discussed how a URL might be different from an IP address because
it identifies the specific page on a website that the individual viewed.54 Also, the footnote

46

Ibid
Ibid.
48
Id. at 48-49.
49
Id. at 49.
50
A URL identities the specific page within a website, as opposed to the IP address, which
captures only the name of the website. As discussed by the court, in certain situations a URL
also has the potential to contain search terms entered by a user.
51
Id. at 49.
52
Id. at 50.
53
512 F.3d at n.6.
54
Ibid.
47
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addresses how certain URLs containing the search terms that the user inputted immediately before
accessing the website would contain “contents.”55 Thus, the concept of information similar to IP
addresses being contents has been explored in the Fourth Amendment context as well.
Regardless of whether it is an “incoming” or “outgoing” IP address, or whether it is in the
context of a statutory or constitutional claim, IP addresses have not been considered “content of
communication.” Despite this consensus view thus far on IP addresses, courts have continued to
move in the direct of considering more information closely related to IP addresses to be content.
As discussed, infra, other factors are also pulling in the direction of constitutional protection for
IP addresses.
3. Other Modern Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
Though dealing with a different technology, the recent district court decisions addressing
the bulk telephony metadata collection program (“telephony program”) could impact future
analysis of internet usage surveillance.
In Klayman, the court rejected the application of Smith to the telephony program in granting
a preliminary injunction to stop the collection based on a potential Fourth Amendment violation.56
Since there was no physical intrusion, the court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test.57
The court determined that it is very likely that the plaintiffs had a “reasonable expectation
of privacy” with respect to the specific metadata collection program at hand in this case. The court

55

Ibid.
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
57
Id. at 30.
56
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reaches this conclusion by not apply Smith.58 The court ultimately concludes that the factual
scenario here is so substantially different from that in Smith that it does not apply.59
The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the factual situations in Smith from the one
at hand. The Court discussed how the Smith Court could not have predicted how phones would
be used today when they contemplated their decision.60 Further, they discussed how the pen
register in Smith was short-term and very fixed in nature, while the collection here is expansive
and long-term.61 The Court also noted the difference in the relationship the Government had with
the phone company, with today’s situation being an ongoing almost contractual situation as
opposed to a one time collection of information.62 Finally, the court reasoned that the most
important distinguishing factor was that the “nature and quantity of the information contained in
people’s telephony metadata is much greater” in the telephony program than what was collected
in Smith.63 The court discussed how due of the pervasiveness of cell phones in our lives, the
metadata, while the same type of information as in Smith, allows the Government to glean much
more information about a person from the metadata today than they did in 1979.64
Having rejected the application of Smith, the court determined whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy without consideration of the third-party doctrine. In doing so, the court
accepts plaintiffs’ statement that they subjectively expected privacy.65 The court the concluded

58

Id. at 37.
Ibid.
60
Id. at 31.
61
Id. at 32.
62
Id. a 32-33.
63
Id. 33-34.
64
Id. 35-36.
65
Id. at 37.
59

12

that the expectation was objectively reasonably.66 However, in doing so, the court makes clear
that its decision is not that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy to all metadata,
just that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy against the particular surveillance method
used by the government in the telephone program.67
In Clapper, the Southern District of New York reached the opposite conclusion with
respect to the same telephony program.68 This opposite holding was reached because the Clapper
court determined that Smith was applicable to analysis of the telephony program.69
The Clapper court discusses how the metadata here is not different in any significant way
from the metadata at hand in Smith.70 The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the information
in the current case allows for a rich mosaic to be created, because it would require multiple steps
by the government outside of the telephony program to create such a picture.71
Finally, the court considered the current landscape of related decisions, first making clear
that the Supreme Court has not overruled Smith.72 The court then addressed the Klayman decision,
stating their belief that the court in that case addressed hypothetical issues down the road and
mistakenly focused on the expansion of the use of the telephone.73

The Clapper court

acknowledges that there is a changing technological landscape, but states that the facts at hand
only concerns the telephone as it is used in the traditional sense.74 Ultimately, the court concludes

66

Ibid.
Ibid.
68
Clapper, 959 F.Supp.2d 724.
69
Id. at 750-51.
70
Id. at 750.
71
Id. at 750-52.
72
Id. at 752.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
67
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that since Smith controls, the NSA’s metadata collection program does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.75
4. Other Approaches that Courts have Considered
Recently, however, the court has begun to question to applicability of Smith in the face of
changing technologies and societal trends.
The applicability of Smith to modern technologies was questioned in a case in front of the
United States Supreme Court in the concurrence in U.S. v. Jones.76 This case dealt with the
installation of a GPS tracking device on a car by the government, and was ultimately deemed to
be a search based on the physical trespass that occurred when the device was installed. Despite
agree with the application of the physical intrusion test to the case at hand, in a concurring opinion,
Justice Sotomayor questioned the third-party doctrine’s merit with respect to modern technologies.
In her concurrence, Sotomayor addresses the potential harms that could come from
allowing extensive governmental surveillance.77 Namely, she identifies that “awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”78 Further, she
recognizes that “the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects
of identity is susceptible to abuse” and may alter the relationship between government and
citizens.79 Along with this, she notes that there are potential issues that could arise from allowing
extensive executive power in this area without oversight from another branch.80

75

Ibid.
132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor J., concurring).
77
Id. at 956.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
76

14

Sotomayor goes on to discuss how it might be time to reconsider the third-party doctrine
in light of changes in both technology and how society interacts with technology.81 She discusses
how people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third-parties in carrying out
mundane tasks based on the nature of current technologies.82 Sotomayor further states that she
would “doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure of every Web
site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”83 Finally, she discusses how secrecy
should no longer be a prerequisite for privacy.84 She argues that just because something is
disclosed to some member of the public for a specific purpose, it should not for that reason alone,
lose its Fourth Amendment Protection.85 However, since the case was resolved based on the
physical intrusion, Sotomayor ultimately concluded that this is an issue that must be decided
another day.86
In DiTomasso, the court determined that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of his email and chat room communications despite agreeing to terms of
service with the websites that they would monitor his activity.87 The court reached this conclusion
by determining that the defendant’s recognition that he would be monitored by the service
providers did not mean that he consented to being searched by the Government. 88 The court

81

Id. at 957.
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
DiTomasso, 2014 WL 5462467 at *5-6.
88
Ibid.
82
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applied the reasoning from Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, in reaching the conclusion
that the third-party doctrine was inapplicable to the case at hand.89
c. How the “Reasonableness” of an Unwarranted Search is Evaluated
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable.90 However, a warrantless search will be valid
if it falls under one of the court recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.91 As was the
case in Klayman, discussed infra, the exception that could apply to the search in our hypothetical
is the “special needs” exception.
The special needs exception involves a balancing test, weighing the individual’s privacy
right against the government interest at stake. However, the preliminary question that needs to be
asked when applying the special needs doctrine is, whether the search serves a purpose
independent of normal law enforcement needs.92 Since the search in this case is aimed at
protecting against terrorist attacks, this threshold question would be easily satisfied.
A court will apply a three part balancing test to determine whether the warrantless search
is justified and therefore valid under the special needs exception.93 The three factors are: (1) the
nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the search; (2) the character of the
intrusion impose by the government; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government’s
concerns and the efficacy of the search in meeting them.94

89

Id. at *6.
City of Ontario, Cal. V. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
91
Ibid.
92
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
93
Klayman, 957 F.Supp.2d at 38 (quoting Bd. of Educ. V. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-34 (2002).
94
Ibid.
90
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In Klayman, the court analyzed whether the government’s warrantless bulk metadata
collection program would be deemed valid as a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.95
The court applied the “special needs” doctrine based on the conclusion that this suspicionless
search could only be justified if there was a government need beyond normal law enforcement. 96
Thus, the court applied the three part balancing test, to determine whether the warrantless search
was valid due to a “special need.”97
The court in Klayman quickly addressed the first two factors, concluding that the plaintiffs
have a significant expectation of privacy and that the bulk metadata collection program
significantly intruded on that expectation.98 The court then addressed the third factor, and
concluded that the government interest was to increase the speed of investigating terrorism as
opposed to generally protecting against terrorism.99 The court went on to state that the program
was not effective in increasing the speed of investigations, citing the lack of evidence of the bulk
metadata collection having stopped or aided in stopping any imminent terrorist attacks.100 Based
on this reasoning, the court concluded that the plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of showing
that their privacy interests outweigh the government interests in collecting and analyzing the
metadata in question.101

95

Klayman, 957 F.Supp.2d at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
97
Id. at 38-42.
98
Id. at 39.
99
Id. at 39-40.
100
Id. at 40-41.
101
Id. at 41.
96
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III. European Approach to the Right to Privacy on the Internet
The right to privacy is explicitly stated in Article Seven of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (“Charter”). Article Seven provides that “Everyone has the right to
respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”102 Additionally, under
Article Eight, the Charter provides “protection of personal data:”
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has
the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by
an independent authority.103
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) recently ruled on a case that dealt with a
mandate that service providers retain data that would be accessed by the government.104 The court
applied a proportionality test in determining that the legislation authorizing the data retention was
invalid as it was not limited to what was strictly necessary to achieve the government’s purpose.105
The legislation at hand mandated that service providers retain certain user information
related to both telephone and internet communications, including the IP addresses of users.106 The
legislation made clear that the substance of communications were not to be retained.107

102

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 7.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 8.
104
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. V. Ireland, C-293/12 (Eur. Ct. H. R. April 8, 2014).
105
Id. at ¶ 69.
106
Id. at ¶ 26.
107
Ibid.
103
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The ECHR concluded that this data, among other things, made it possible to know the
identity of the user and who the user was communicating with.108 The ECHR determined that the
data as a whole might allow precise conclusions about the individual to be drawn, including habits
of daily life, activities carried out, and social relationships they are involved in.109
The ECHR then discussed how fundamental rights of individuals are harmed by this
retention program.110

Specifically, the ECHR focused on Articles Seven and Eight of the

Charter.111 The ECHR discusses how it does not matter if the information is sensitive or whether
the person conceived of the information as being protected, all that matters is there was an
interference with these rights by retaining this data and providing it to the government. 112
The ECHR then discussed whether there was a “general interests” that this legislation
achieved.113 The ECHR discussed how the material object of the legislation was to contribute to
the fight against serious crime, including terrorism, and the ultimate goal was to enhance public
security.114 The ECHR concluded that this was a “general interest.”115
Since there was both an infringement of a fundamental right and a general interest, the
ECHR applied a proportionality test.116 Under this test, the legislation must not “exceed the limits
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Id. at ¶ 27.
110
Id. ¶ 32.
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Id. at ¶ 31.
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Id. at ¶ 33.
113
Id. at ¶ 38.
114
Id. at ¶ 42.
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Ibid.
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Id. at ¶ 46.
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of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve [its] objectives.”117 Essentially, the
legislation may only infringe on individual rights where it is “strictly necessary.”118
The ECHR found that the legislation was not limited to what was strictly necessary to
achieve the general interest so it was invalid. Specifically the ECHR was concerned with the broad
application of the surveillance and the failure of the legislation to focus the data gathering towards
the prevention of crime.119 Despite the governmental interest in prevention of terrorism, the ECHR
was unwilling to uphold the wide-sweeping surveillance legislation under proportionality review
since the legislation “entail[ed] a wide-ranging and particularly serious” interference with the
individual’s protected rights in their privacy and data.120

IV. Future of Right to Privacy on the Internet in Light of Concerns of Terrorism
a. How Should the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Standard be Applied in
Future Cases?
Despite recent questioning of its long term sustainability, the third-party doctrine
announced in Smith is the current standard of the United States Supreme Court. While under the
current landscape a court will almost certainly find that an individual does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy to their IP address, there are strong policy reasons to change to a standard
that protects this information.

117

Ibid.
Id. at ¶ 52.
119
Id. at ¶¶ 57-60.
120
Id. at ¶ 65.
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The concurring opinion of Justice Sotomayor in Jones provides a forward thinking
perspective on the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections. Sotomayor focuses on
the changes that have occurred in the dynamic between society and technology.
Today, the internet use is so extensive that it occupies a major role in both work and social
lives of a significant portion of Americans. The internet has become the dominant and at times
exclusive means of communication, research, socialization, and expression for many Americans.
Additionally, some content, including much of the information on ISIS, is only available through
the internet.
One major problem with the continued growth of internet use in society today is that
individual privacy is being sacrificed along the way. Unless a highly skilled individual goes to
great lengths to avoid using one, accessing the internet is only possible by using an ISP. While
this does not present a problem in terms of using the internet, this reality has major implications
on the ability of the Government to monitor internet use.
Since all internet access is achieved through an ISP, all communications on the internet is
necessarily conveyed through a third-party. Therefore, all communication on the internet is subject
to analysis under Smith. As discussed above in Forrester and Christie, under this analysis, courts
have exclusively held that IP addresses are not “content,” and thus not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, any government surveillance that involves obtaining IP addresses is not
a “search” and thus never requires a warrant. This conclusion by the courts places the privacy of
internet users at great risk.
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There are two primary reasons why the court reaches this conclusion. First, court continue
to apply the Smith doctrine, despite it being inapplicable to the technologies of today. Along with
this, courts fail to recognize that IP addresses are “content of communications.”
The Smith doctrine is inapplicable to the technology of today because it fails to account for
the inescapable requirement to relay communication through a third-party. This reality calls into
question one of the basic premises of Smith, that disclosures to the third-party are voluntary. It
cannot be argued that a person voluntarily chooses to send information to their ISP when accessing
the internet. However, the voluntariness can be called into question because of the lack of
alternatives to the third-party disclosure. As discussed in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Jones, forcing individuals to choose between, accessing the internet while being monitored and
not accessing the internet at all, chills expressive freedoms. Third-party disclosure on the internet
is not truly voluntary. Similar to the discussion in DiTomasso, the recognition by individuals that
they have to disclose information to their ISP should not mean that they are agreeing to disclose
their information to the government. As the pervasiveness of the internet in our lives continues to
grow, the “voluntariness” of the third-party becomes more questionable. Since voluntariness was
a focus of the Smith holding, it is time for the Court to reconsider the application of the third-party
doctrine to the internet and related technologies.
However, if the Smith doctrine continues to be applied to the internet, IP addresses should
be considered “content of communications” and thus receive Fourth Amendment protection based
on the vast amount of information that can be gleaned from monitoring them. Under current
analysis, IP addresses have been analogized with phone numbers that are dialed on a phone. This
comparison fail to take into account the expansive picture that can be painted by compiling the IP
addresses an individual accesses. As was recognized by the European Court of Human Rights,
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tracking an IP address can result in the acquiring of a detailed picture of an individual’s life. While
the European approach was supported by provisions in their Charter protecting the right to privacy
and the right to protection of personal data, the Fourth Amendment must be the source of privacy
protection in America. Therefore, courts should abandon the narrow interpretation of what IP
addresses contain, and adopt the reasoning of the ECHR.
The conclusions of the ECHR recognize the resulting picture that can be drawn from
analysis of large amounts of IP addresses or other metadata in today’s world. While an IP address
will not show the details of the website or the exact links that are followed while the individual is
on the website, there is a great deal that can be revealed in the name of the website itself. Though
some IP addresses will not reveal any information on the user, such as www.google.com, there are
others that could be very telling and thus allow the government access into private matters. For
instance, an individual who is dealing with alcohol abuse might visit websites such as
www.quitalcohol.com or www.alcoholrehab.com. Clearly, obtaining these IP addresses would
allow the government to know that this individual has an interest in alcohol recovery. The same
result could occur with IP addresses related to any number of private issues, such as sexual
orientation, gender identity, religious beliefs, and abortions.
An argument has been made that this information can also be gleaned from the phone
numbers that are dialed, as was the case in Smith. For instance, the government could glean the
same alcohol abuse information if an individual that was being monitored dialed the phone number
of an alcohol rehabilitation facility. While this is true to some extent, the main difference between
the pen registers in Smith and the monitoring today is scale, both in terms of individual use and
government surveillance.
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By determining that IP addresses are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the courts
allow unchecked government surveillance of all internet activity. This approach fails to recognize
the privacy interests that are at stake by leaving unprotected the vast amount of information that
can be gleaned from IP addresses.
The Court should adopt an approach that more appropriately addresses whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy, which can be achieved by not focusing on whether the
information was disclosed to a third-party. A shift in focus away from disclosure to a third-party
will eliminate the content vs. non-content distinction. Instead, the court should return to the basic
principles of Katz and evaluate whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy considering
both the subjective and objective prongs. While this will involve more balancing of objectiveness
by individual courts, it is better than operating under the continued assumption that there is no
expectation of privacy as a result of disclosure to an internet service provider.

b. If There is a “Search,” How will the Reasonableness of that Search be Evaluated
in Light of the Government Interest In Preventing Terrorism?
If it was determined that there was a “search” in the monitoring of our hypothetical, the
next step would be to analyze whether the search is valid despite being warrantless. As discussed
above, the most likely means of finding the warrantless search valid is under the “special needs”
exception.
Analysis under the special needs exception involves a three factor balancing test: (1) the
nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the search; (2) the character of the
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intrusion impose by the government; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government’s
concerns and the efficacy of the search in meeting them.
Considering the first factor, the privacy interest at stake is significant. The interest at stake
here is very similar to that of Klayman. This is not a case where the environment of the search
makes it so there is a diminished expectation of privacy. Instead, examples of when there has been
found to be a diminished expectation of privacy under the special needs exception include searches
while is on public transportation and while entering into private property such as sports stadiums.
While it is clear that the first factor weighs in favor of the search being deemed unreasonable, the
lack of diminished expectation of privacy is not determinative on its own.
Next, the court will look to the character of the intrusion of the privacy right. As was the
case in Klayman, if it is deemed to be a “search,” the surveillance at issue would be quite an
invasive search. The protected content of the individual’s IP address would be fully obtained by
the government every time one of the monitored sites is accessed. A further inquiry into the IP
address would lead to personal information being obtained, and further surveillance of the IP
address would lead to extensive information being obtained about the individual’s life.
The major factor weighing in favor of the special needs doctrine applying to the search is
that the government interest is protecting against terrorism. There is no doubt that everyone will
agree that terrorist prevention is of the highest priority among government interests.
In light of Klayman, in which the court framed the government’s goal in the telephony
program quite narrowly as only being aimed at increasing the speed of investigating terrorism, the
primary question would be what the government interest is in the hypothetical. While much of the
Klayman reasoning is sound and forward thinking, its framing of the government interest is
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extremely narrow. It seems likely that future courts to address this issue will move towards a
broader reading of the government purpose. With this belief in mind, it seems that the government
interest in the hypothetical would be identification of potential terrorist threats.
While this government interest in mind, the court would have to analyze whether the
program was efficient in achieving this goal. In Klayman, the court looked to the failure of the
telephony program to assist in the prevention of any imminent terrorist attacks. A similar analysis
would likely occur in our hypothetical.
Having considered the factors individually, the court would then have to weigh all three
factors against each other in a balancing test. Based on the above discussion, the court will likely
be left with a weighing of a full-fledged privacy interest of the individual against a Government
interest in preventing terrorism.
When a similar analysis was done by the ECHR under proportionality review, they reached
the conclusion the legislation did not adhere to the requirement of encroaching on individual rights
only when it is “strictly necessary” to do so. Under this approach, it seems likely that the
hypothetical program would fail as the European statute did. However, it is less clear whether
such a result would follow under the special needs balancing test, which applies a less restrictive
standard to government intrusion on individual’s privacy rights.
V. Conclusion
The current privacy protection for internet content in America fails to account for the
realities of modern technology and government surveillance abilities. In order to better protect the
privacy on individuals who access the internet, the American approach should follow the lead of
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Europe and begin to protect the spectrum of personal information contained in internet browsing
data.
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